Abstract Key predistribution schemes for distributed sensor networks have received significant attention in the recent literature. In this paper we propose a new construction method for these schemes based on combinations of duals of standard block designs. Our method is a broad spectrum one which works for any intersection threshold. By varying the initial designs, we can generate various schemes and this makes the method quite flexible. We also obtain explicit algebraic expressions for the metrics for local connectivity and resiliency. These schemes are quite efficient with regard to connectivity and resiliency and at the same time they allow a straightforward shared-key discovery.
In this paper we propose a new method for constructing KPSs and then study the properties of the resulting schemes. Realizing a connection between the transversal designs used by Lee and Stinson (2008) in their construction for q = 1 and a particular type of partially balanced incomplete block designs, we consider the latter designs in their full generality and show that we can construct useful KPSs based on a suitable combination of partially balanced incomplete block designs. We propose one general construction method for any given intersection threshold q (≥ 1), and it will be seen that for the case q = 1, our construction covers the linear scheme of Lee and Stinson (2008) . One advantage of our proposed method is that it works for all q(≥ 1), and by varying the choices of the designs, one can construct KPSs for networks with varying numbers of nodes, key-pool sizes and numbers of keys per node, thus providing more flexibility in choosing a scheme suitable for the requirements of a situation. For example, now the number of nodes need not be of the particular forms p 2 or p 3 , with p prime or prime power, as in Lee and Stinson (2008) . These points will be elaborated on in Section 8.
Another advantage of our method of construction is that it allows us to obtain unified and explicit algebraic expressions for the metrics for evaluating the connectivity and resiliency of these schemes, all for general values of q(≥ 1). Using these expressions, the metrics can be easily calculated from the parameters of the particular designs used in the construction. This may be contrasted with Lee and Stinson (2008) , Ruj and Roy (2007) or Ruj et al. (2009) , where evaluation of the metrics can involve explicit enumeration which may become cumbersome.
We also show that our KPSs have good connectivity with high levels of resiliency and the combinatorial structure of the underlying designs make the shared-key discovery and path-key establishment phases particularly simple.
In Section 2 of this paper we give some preliminaries on various metrics for evaluating a KPS, followed by some basics on block designs. Section 3 describes our proposed method for constructing a KPS. Next, in Sections 4 and 5 we obtain expressions for the connectivity and resiliency metrics for these schemes and give illustrative examples. In Section 6 we apply our method to constructions based on some specific block designs, together with numerical illustrations. In Section 7 we discuss how we can label the keys and nodes so that shared-key discovery and path-key establishment become simple. Finally in Section 8 we discuss the gains achieved via our method of construction.
Preliminaries 2.1 Some metrics for evaluating KPSs
Several authors have considered some standard metrics for evaluating the performance of key predistribution schemes for distributed sensor networks. We briefly describe these metrics here; a more comprehensive account can be found in Lee and Stinson (2008) .
Two basic metrics of a KPS are the network size or the number of nodes in the network and the key storage or the number of keys stored per node, usually denoted by n and k, respectively.
A KPS should typically have large n, say 1000 or much higher and small k, say about 50, though some authors have used k up to 200.
In a DSN the nodes are scattered over a physical area and, since nodes have limited power, each can send or receive signals only over a certain wireless communication range or neighborhood.
Once the nodes are deployed, any two nodes which are within each other's neighborhood can securely communicate directly with each other if they have at least q common keys, where q(≥ 1) is a specified integer, the intersection threshold of the DSN. On the other hand, if two nodes in the same neighborhood do not have q common keys, then they can establish a connection through multiple secure links if there is a sequence of one or more intermediate nodes connecting them such that every pair of adjacent nodes in this sequence share q common keys.
To study the local connectivity of the network, we adopt the metrics used in Stinson (2005b, 2008) , and for this, we now introduce the relevant probabilities as defined by them.
Define Pr 1 to be the probability that two random nodes share at least q common keys. Thus given any two randomly chosen nodes within each other's neighborhood, Pr 1 is the probability that these two nodes can establish secure direct communication with each other. Also, define Pr 2 to be the probability that two nodes in the same neighborhood do not have q common keys but there is a third node within the intersection of their neighborhoods which shares q common keys with both of them, thus allowing these two nodes to communicate securely via this third node. So Pr 2 is the probability that two randomly chosen nodes within the same neighborhood fail to establish direct communication but can communicate via a two-hop path. Hence, the sum Pr = Pr 1 + Pr 2 is a useful metric for studying the local connectivity of a KPS through either a secure direct link or a secure two-hop path. Now suppose in an attack on the network a number of sensor nodes are captured at random.
Then it is assumed that all keys stored in these compromised nodes are revealed and so cannot be used for communication any more. Consider any two uncompromised nodes, say A and A ′ , which have at least q common keys. Then the direct communication link between A and A ′ fails if keys common to them occur in one or more of the compromised nodes; otherwise, the link remains secure. We want the sensor network to be resilient against such random node compromises. From this consideration, resiliency is measured by fail(s), which represents the conditional probability of the link between A and A ′ to fail when out of the remaining n − 2 nodes, s randomly chosen ones are compromised, given that A and A ′ share at least q common keys. A smaller value of fail(s) implies a larger resiliency.
Finally, in order to communicate, two nodes in the same neighborhood need to determine if they share q common keys; this is the shared-key discovery phase, and if they do not, then they try to establish a secure two-hop path for communication; this is the path-key establishment phase. The difficulties involved in these two phases are also used to assess the utility of a KPS.
Some basics on block designs
We present some basic definitions of block designs and related concepts which we will need in our constructions of KPSs. Illustrative examples are also given. For more details on these designs we refer to Street and Street (1987) , Stinson (2003) and Dey (2010 (j, u, w = 0, 1, 2) .
The following relations are evident from Definition 2.4:
Various association schemes are available in the literature and for these we refer to Clatworthy (1973) . Our construction and results are valid for any general association scheme but in our illustrations in Section 6, we use three of these association schemes, namely group divisible, triangular and Latin square type association schemes. These are defined below. The above definition implies that for the GD association scheme, in addition to (1) we have
Example 2.3 Let a = 2, f = 3. Then the 6 symbols are partitioned into two groups as:
{11, 12, 13}, {21, 22, 23}. Now, for the symbol 11, the 1st associates are 12, 13 while its 2nd associates are 21, 22, 23. Similarly, the 1st and 2nd associates of other symbols may be written down and the parameters of the scheme can be obtained. The above definition implies that for the triangular association scheme, in addition to (1) we
Example 2.4 Let m = 5. The 5 2 (= 10) symbols are denoted by the ordered pairs: 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25, 34, 35, 45 . Now, for the symbol 12, the 1st associates are 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25 The above definition implies that for the Latin square type association scheme, in addition to
Example 2.5 Let p = 4 and k = 3. We denote the 4 2 (= 16) symbols by the ordered pairs: 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 22, . . . , 43, 44 Then it follows that for the symbol 11, the 2nd associates are 12, 13, 14, 21, 31, 41, 24, 33, 42, while its 1st associates are 22, 23, 32, 34, 43, 44 . Similarly, the 1st and 2nd associates of other symbols may be written down and the parameters of the scheme obtained. The integers λ 1 and λ 2 are the two concurrence parameters of the PBIB design, where λ 1 = λ 2 .
Example 2.6 We can construct a PBIB design d * based on the GD association scheme by pairing each of the af symbols with its second associates to form the blocks. Thus, such a design can be constructed for every integer a, f (≥ 2). It is easy to see that this design will have v * = af, b * = a 2 f 2 , k * = 2, r * = (a − 1)f and λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1. For example, a PBIB design based on the GD association scheme in Example 2.3 can be constructed by pairing each of the 6 symbols with its second associates to get 9 blocks as follows:
Block Symbol Block Symbol Block Symbol .
Clearly, this GD design has v * = 6, b * = 9, k * = 2, r * = 3, λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1. For a given positive integer t(≥ 1), we now consider t block designs d * 1 , . . . , d * t such that each d * i is a PBIB design based on an association scheme with two associate classes and concurrence parameters λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1, the common occurrence number of every symbol in d * i (i = 1, . . . , t) being at least t. For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, let θ j (i) denote the number of jth associates of any block of d i , and given any two blocks which are jth associates of each other, let φ j u,w (i) denote the number of blocks of d i which are uth associates of one and wth associates of the other (j, u, w = 0, 1, 2). Then clearly, for each design d i the relations corresponding to (1) hold, and moreover,
Example 2.8 Let d * 1 be the PBIB design given in Example 2.6. Then, the dual of d * 1 is given by a design d 1 with 6 symbols arranged in 9 blocks. Denoting these symbols as 1(1), . . . , 9(1) and the blocks as B 1 (1), . . . , B 6 (1) as described above, the design d 1 has blocks given by: Block 1st associates 2nd associates
So, in addition to the relations in (1), we have
In the above development, we can as well take any d * i to be a BIB design with λ = 1, each symbol appearing at least t times in the design. Then by Definitions 2.2 and 2.3, its dual design d i will again satisfy the conditions (I)-(IV), but with θ 1 (i) = 0. This is because in this case, any two blocks of d i will always have exactly one symbol in common and so by (IV), any two distinct blocks of d i can only be second associates, there being no 1st associates for any block.
Thus, conditions (1) and (2) are valid, keeping in mind that now in (2), θ 1 (i) = 0 and in (1), the quantities φ 1 u,w (i) do not arise, while φ 0 u,w (i) = 0 and φ 2 u,w (i) = 0 whenever u = 1 or w = 1.
Example 2.9 Let d * 2 be the BIB design in Example 2.1. Then, the dual of d * 2 is the design in Example 2.2, denoted by d 2 , say. Clearly, d 2 satisfies conditions (I)-(III) with v 2 = 12, b 2 = 9, r 2 = 3, k 2 = 4. Also, condition (IV) is satisfied with no block in d 2 having any other block as its 1st associate, all distinct blocks being 2nd associates of each other. Thus, in addition to the relations in (1), we have
In view of the above discussion, define two sets Q andQ as
Clearly, i ∈ Q if d * i is a PBIB design and i ∈Q if d * i is a BIB design as indicated above.
Construction of KPS
Suppose the intersection threshold of the required KPS is stipulated as q. We consider t = q block designs d * i , 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where each d * i is either a PBIB design with λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1 or a BIB design with λ = 1; every symbol appearing at least t times in each design. As before, for 
By condition (III) in Subsection 2.2, every node has k = t i=1 k i keys. Note that n is multiplicative in the b i while k is additive in the k i , 1 ≤ i ≤ t. As illustrated later, this helps in attaining the twin objectives of having a large number of nodes in the network while keeping the number of keys stored per node relatively small.
Remark 3.1 One of the two constructions in Lee and Stinson (2008) , namely, the one with q = 1, is covered by (4). This fact will be elucidated in more detail in Remarks 4.3 and 5.3. 2
For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, it is clear from (4) that the block B α i (i) is the contribution of the design d i to the node N (α 1 . . . α t ). From this perspective, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.1 When nodes are constructed as in (4), the block of d i that appears in any node

A is called the projection of the node A on the design d i and is denoted by proj(A, i).
Thus from (4), B α i (i) is the projection of the node N (α 1 . . . α t ) on d i . We now define an association scheme on the set of nodes as given by (4). This will play a crucial role in exploring the properties of the KPSs obtained through (4). Here each associate relationship is represented by a t-tuple of the form j 1 . . . j t . We illustrate the above ideas with a small toy example below.
Example 3.1 Toy Example: Let q = 2. So, by the above method, we take t = 2 and construct a KPS with q = 2 based on two designs, d * 1 and d * 2 . Let us take d * 1 as the PBIB design given in Example 2.6 and d * 2 as the BIB design in Example 2.1. Their respective duals d 1 and d 2 are given in Examples 2.8 and 2.2. The KPS constructed by the above method has n = b 1 b 2 = 54 nodes with k = k 1 + k 2 = 7 keys per node. Using (4), we get the key assignments in the nodes, for example, two typical nodes are:
N (1, 1) = B 1 (1) ∪ B 1 (2) = 1(1), 2(1), 3(1), 2(2), 3(2), 7(2), 10(2), and
Then, by Definition 3.1, the blocks B 1 (1) and B 1 (2) are the projections of the node N (1, 1) on the designs d 1 and d 2 , respectively, i.e., proj(N (1, 1), 1) = B 1 (1) and proj(N (1, 1), 2) = B 1 (2).
Similarly, proj(N (3, 4), 1) = B 3 (1) and proj(N (3, 4), 2) = B 4 (2). Now, from Examples 2.8 and 2.9, we see that B 1 (1) and B 3 (1) are 1st associates while B 1 (2) and B 4 (2) are 2nd associates.
So, by Definition 3.2 we say that nodes N (1, 1) and N (3, 4) are 12th associates of each other. 2
In Definition 3.2, j 1 . . . j t = 0 . . . 0, since the nodes A and A ′ are distinct. Also, by (3), j i = 0, 1 or 2 if i ∈ Q and j i = 0 or 2 if i ∈Q. Thus the set of all possible associate relationships between two distinct nodes in the KPS is given by
We now obtain expressions for certain parameters of the association scheme on the set of nodes, as given by Definition 3.2. For j 1 . . . j t ∈ I, let n j 1 ...jt denote the number of j 1 . . . j t th associates of any node A. Then by Definition 3.2, n j 1 ...jt equals the product, over 1 ≤ i ≤ t, of the number of j i th associates of proj(A, i). Therefore,
Again, given any two nodes which are j 1 . . . j t th associates of each other, let p j 1 ...jt u 1 ...ut,w 1 ...wt denote the number of nodes that are u 1 . . . u t th associates of one node and w 1 . . . w t th associates of the other, where j 1 . . . j t , u 1 . . . u t and w 1 . . . w t ∈ I. Then as in (6),
Let λ j 1 ...jt denote the number of common keys between any two distinct nodes A and A ′ which are j 1 . . . j t th associates of each other, j 1 . . . j t ∈ I. Then from Definition 3.2 it follows that
where ψ j i (i) is the number of symbols (or equivalently, keys) common to proj(A, i) and proj(A ′ , i) when they are j i th associates of each other. By condition (IV) of Subsection 2.2 and the fact that each block of d i is the 0th associate of itself, it is evident that
We illustrate these concepts by continuing with the toy example in Example 3.1.
Example 3.2 Toy Example continued:
Since d * 1 is a PBIB and d * 2 a BIB design, by (5), the set of all possible associate relationships between any two nodes in the KPS is I = {02, 10, 12, 20, 22}. Now, Examples 2.8 and 2.9 show that θ 1 (1) = 2, θ 2 (1) = 3 and θ 2 (2) = 8. Recalling from (1) that θ 0 (1) = θ 0 (2) = 1, by (6) it follows that the number of 02th associates of any node in the KPS is n 02 = 1 × 8 = 8. Similarly, n 10 = 2, n 12 = 16, n 20 = 3, n 22 = 24. Now, using the values of φ j 1 u 1 ,w 1 (1) and φ j 2 u 2 ,w 2 (2) from Examples 2.8 and 2.9 and remembering (1), it follows from (7) that p 12 02,10 = φ 1 01 (1)φ 2 20 (2) = 1 × 1 = 1 = p 12 10,02 , and similarly, p 12 22,20 = p 12 20,22 = 3 × 1 = 3, p 12 22,22 = 3 × 7 = 21, p 12 02,12 = p 12 12,02 = 1 × 7 = 7, p 12 10,12 = p 12 12,10 = 1 × 1 = 1, p 12 12,12 = 1 × 7 = 7, while every other p 12 u 1 u 2 ,w 1 w 2 equals zero. Again, by (9), ψ 0 (1) = 3, ψ 0 (2) = 4, ψ 1 (1) = 0, ψ 2 (1) = ψ 2 (2) = 1, and so it follows from (8) that the number of symbols common between any two nodes which are 02th associates of each other is λ 02 = 3 + 1 = 4. Similarly, λ 10 = 4, λ 12 = 1, λ 20 = 5, λ 22 = 2. Hence, since q = 2, all pairs of nodes, other than those which are 12th associates of each other, can communicate directly with one another. 2
Local connectivity
In this section we explore the local connectivity of the KPS introduced in (4). Theorem 4.1 is the main result in this section and it gives an expression for the metric Pr for this scheme, in terms of the parameters of the constituent designs. Some notation and two lemmas are needed in order to present the theorem. Let
where I is given by (5). So, any two nodes which are j 1 . . . j t th associates of each other can communicate directly only if j 1 . . . j t ∈ ∆. Let∆ be the complement of ∆ in I and let ∆ , ∆ and I stand for sums over j 1 . . . j t ∈ ∆, j 1 . . . j t ∈∆ and j 1 . . . j t ∈ I, respectively.
Given two distinct nodes which are j 1 . . . j t th associates of each other, let µ j 1 ...jt denote the number of nodes sharing at least q(= t) common keys with both of them. Also, for any two distinct nodes A and A ′ in each other's neighborhood, let the intersection of their neighborhoods contain η nodes excluding A and A ′ themselves. Define
Lemma 4.1 Any j 1 . . . j t (∈ I) is a member of ∆ if and only if either
Proof of Lemma 4.1 Follows from (8), (9) and (10) 
and
Proof of Theorem 4.1 Let C be the event that the nodes A and A ′ can establish communication either directly or via a two-hop path. Define E(j 1 . . . j t ) as the event that A and A ′ are j 1 . . . j t th associates of each other. Since the events E(j 1 . . . j t ), j 1 . . . j t ∈ I, are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, we can write
where P {C|E(j 1 . . . j t )} is, as usual, the conditional probability of C, given E(j 1 . . . j t ). Now, for each j 1 . . . j t ∈ I, recalling that there are n j 1 ...jt nodes which are j 1 . . . j t th associates of any given node, it follows that
Moreover, if j 1 . . . j t ∈ ∆, then by (10), A and A ′ have at least t common keys and hence can establish direct communication, implying
On the other hand, if j 1 . . . j t ∈∆, then they have less than t common keys. In this case, direct communication between A and A ′ is not possible but they can establish communication via a two-hop path provided the intersection of their neighborhoods contains one of the µ j 1 ...jt nodes sharing at least t common keys with both of them. Hence, using (11), it is clear that
Substitution of (15), (16) and (17) in (14) establishes the theorem. 2
Remark 4.1 The approximation used in (13) is quite accurate when the quantities n − 2 − µ j 1 ,...,jt are large relative to η, which is typically the case. Note also that the expression for Pr 2 in (13) is a refinement of that used in Lee and Stinson (2008) for q = 2. To see this, first note
because I n j 1 ...jt = n − 1. Next, write µ * = min{µ j 1 ...jt : j 1 . . . j t ∈∆} and from (11) observe that β j 1 ...jt ≥ β * for every j 1 . . . j t ∈∆, where β * is defined as in (11) with µ j 1 ...jt replaced by µ * . As a result, from (13) and (18), we get
For their quadratic scheme, Lee and Stinson (2008) took Pr 2 as the counterpart of the lower bound in (19) for their setup. Instead, we work here with the more direct expression given in (13), and in addition, this is valid for all q ≥ 1. 2
Remark 4.2 Lee and Stinson (2008) remarked that it is difficult to find an algebraic expression of µ * for their quadratic KPS, and therefore, studied Pr 2 through design specific numerical evaluation of µ * . An advantage of our method is that for all q(≥ 1), even when one starts with arbitrary designs, Theorem 4.1 gives readily applicable algebraic expressions for both Pr 1 and Pr 2 for our schemes in terms of the design parameters. Equations (2), (6), (7), and Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 can be used in finding the n j 1 ...jt and µ j 1 ...jt , and hence one can find Pr 1 and Pr 2 explicitly in specific situations. The following examples serve to illustrate this point for the cases q = 1 and q = 2. 2 Example 4.1 Case: q = 1. We take t = 1 and construct a KPS as in (4) with d * 1 either (a) a PBIB or (b) a BIB design.
(a) If d * 1 is a PBIB design with λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1, then its dual design d 1 has θ 1 (1) > 0. Then n = b 1 and by (3), (5) and Lemma 4.1, Q = {1}, I = {1, 2}, ∆ = {2} and∆ = {1}. Also, from (6) and (7), n 1 = θ 1 (1), n 2 = θ 2 (1) and p 1 2,2 = φ 1 2,2 (1). So by Lemma 4.2, µ 1 = p 1 2,2 = φ 1 2,2 (1). Hence (12) and (13) yield Recalling Definitions 2.7 and 2.8 it can now be checked that such a transversal design is actually the dual of a PBIB design based on a Latin square type association scheme with v * = p 2 , b * = kp, r * = k, k * = p, and λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1. Hence one can verify that their construction can equivalently be described via our construction in (4) with t = 1 and d * 1 chosen as this PBIB design. Then its dual d 1 is their transversal design involving v 1 = kp symbols and b 1 = p 2 blocks, such that conditions (I)-(IV) of Subsection 2.2 hold with r 1 = p,
Hence we can apply (20) to get
These exactly match the expressions for Pr 1 and Pr 2 in Subsection 4.1.1 of Lee and Stinson (2008) . We will see in Remark 5.3 that their expression for fail(s) also follow from our corresponding expressions. (2) and (6), n 02 = θ 2 (2), n 10 = θ 1 (1), n 12 = θ 1 (1)θ 2 (2), n 20 = θ 2 (1) and n 22 = θ 2 (1)θ 2 (2). So from (12), on using (2), we have
Next by (7) and Lemma 4.2, 
Since∆ = {12} and n 12 = θ 1 (1)θ 2 (2), (13) now yields
with µ 12 as given in (22). 2 Pr 2 can be readily obtained using these expressions for the n j 1 j 2 and µ j 1 j 2 , j 1 j 2 ∈∆, in (13). 2
Resiliency
We now study the resiliency of the KPS as given by (4) and for this we recall the notion of fail(s) introduced in Subsection 2.1. Theorem 5.1 below gives an algebraic expression for fail(s) and it is the main result of this section. Some notation and a lemma are needed in order to present the theorem.
Let A and A ′ be two distinct nodes which have at least t common keys, i.e., by (10), they are j 1 . . . j t th associates of each other, for some j 1 . . . j t ∈ ∆. Then by Lemma 4.1, the set Ω = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ t, j i = 0 or 2} is nonempty. For i ∈ Ω, let δ j i (i) equal 1 or r i according as j i = 0 or 2, respectively. Consider now any nonempty subset Γ of Ω. Then for i ∈ Γ, as noted in does not include the single key common to proj(A, i) and proj(A ′ , i) whenever j i = 2.
Lemma 5.1 With reference to any two distinct nodes A and A ′ which are j 1 . . . j t th associates of each other, where j 1 . . . j t ∈ ∆, the cardinality of H(A, A ′ ; Γ) defined as above is given by
Proof of Lemma 5.1 In view of the definition of the δ j i (i), this is evident from (4) on recalling that every symbol occurs in r i blocks of d i by condition (II) of Subsection 2.2. 2
Then for s < min(k 1 , . . . , k t ),
Proof of Theorem 5.1 Consider two distinct nodes A and A ′ . Let D denote the event that they have at least q(= t) common keys and F denote the event that the link between them fails when out of the remaining n − 2 nodes, s randomly chosen ones are compromised. Then
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, let E(j 1 . . . j t ) denote the event that A and A ′ are j 1 . . . j t th associates of each other. Then by (10) and (15),
Similarly,
In order to find an expression for the conditional probability in (26), take any fixed j 1 . . . j t ∈ ∆, and condition on the event that A and A ′ are j 1 . . . j t th associates of each other. Then as noted in the context of Lemma 5.1, the set Ω = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ t, j i = 0 or 2} is nonempty. By (9), proj(A, i) and proj(A ′ , i) have one or more common keys if and only if i ∈ Ω. For any such i, let G i denote the event that not all of the key(s) common to proj(A, i) and proj(A ′ , i) occur in one or more of the s randomly chosen nodes that are compromised. Then for the fixed j 1 . . . j t under consideration, by the usual union intersection formula,
where the sum on the extreme right is over all nonempty subsets Γ of Ω, and |Γ| denotes the cardinality of Γ. Note that the right side of (27) depends on j 1 . . . j t through Ω.
For any fixed nonempty subset Γ of Ω, we now find the probability P (∩ i∈Γ G i ) appearing in (27). Denote the s randomly chosen nodes that are compromised by A * 1 , . . . , A * s . Fix any i ∈ Γ, so that j i = 0 or 2. 
Since ξ j i (i) = 1 for j i = 1, i.e., for i / ∈ Ω, and
for j i = 0 or 2, i.e., for i ∈ Ω, substitution of (28) in (27) yields
If we now substitute (29) in (26) and then substitute (25) and (26) in (24) can also be treated in the same way as Example 4.3 and so is not shown here.
Example 5.1 Example 4.1 (continued). Here t = 1, n = b 1 and, irrespective of whether d * 1 is a PBIB design with λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1, or a BIB design with λ = 1, we have ∆ = {2}. Hence Theorem 5.1 yields 
Also,
One can now readily apply Theorem 5.1 to find fail(s). 2
Applications
As mentioned earlier, our method of construction, based on (4) and applicable to any q(≥ 1), can yield KPSs for widely diverse values of the underlying parameters such as the number of nodes n, the number of keys per node k and the key pool size v, thus enabling the practitioner to find a suitable KPS depending on the requirements of a given situation. This flexibility arises because of the freedom in choosing the PBIB or BIB designs d * 1 , . . . , d * t that one starts with while applying (4). Furthermore, the analytical results in the last two sections can be applied to ensure that the resulting KPSs behave nicely with regard to local connectivity and resiliency, as measured by Pr and fail(s).
In order to give a flavor of the points noted above without making the presentation too long, we now focus on the case q = 2 and in the next three subsections present three applications where i.e., they employ only BIB designs or only transversal designs and so on, and as a result, it is very difficult for these methods to achieve parameter values as diverse as what is achieved, for instance, in (a)-(c) above. In addition, the existing methods are not always informative about the properties of the resulting KPSs with regard to local connectivity or resiliency. We will return to this comparison in more detail in the concluding section.
Use of a PBIB design based on the group divisible association scheme and a BIB design
Suppose the design d * 1 in Example 4.3 is a PBIB design based on the group divisible association scheme as in Example 2.6, with v * 1 = af, b * 1 = a 2 f 2 , k * 1 = 2, r * 1 = (a − 1)f, λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1. As seen there, such a d * 1 exists for all integers a, f (≥ 2). Also, let the d * 2 in Example 4.3 be a BIB design with v * 2 = 2g + 1, b * 2 = 1 3 (2g + 1)g, k * 2 = 3, r * 2 = g, λ = 1. Such a BIB design corresponds to the Steiner's triple system and it is well known (cf. Kirkman (1847)) that it exists for every integer g(≥ 3) satisfying g = 0 or 1 (mod 3). Note that the BIB design in Example 2.1 belongs to this class with g = 4.
In our construction (4), now take t = 2, with d 1 and d 2 chosen as the dual designs of d * 1 and d * 2 , respectively. Then recalling Definition 2.2, the parameters of d 1 are
and the parameters of d 2 are
The KPS obtained from d 1 and d 2 via (4) has v = v 1 + v 2 = a 2 f 2 + 1 3 (2g + 1)g keys and n = b 1 b 2 = af (2g + 1) nodes, there being k = k 1 + k 2 = (a − 1)f + g keys in every node. For this KPS, substitution of (33) and (34) in (22) yields µ 12 = 2 + (a − 1)f (2g + 1) and hence from (21) and (23) we get
Similarly, substitution of (33) and (34) in (31) and (32) yields n 02 = 2g, n 10 = f − 1, n 20 = (a − 1)f, n 22 = 2(a − 1)f g,
Theorem 5.1 can now be easily used to find fail(s).
On varying the values of a, f and g we can get various choices of d * 1 and d * 2 , leading to KPSs for a variety of parameter values. Two illustrative examples follow. 
BIB design
Now suppose the design d * 1 in Example 4.3 is a triangular PBIB design as constructed in Example 2.7.
2 , λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1, and as seen there, such a d * 1 exists for every integer m(≥ 4). Also, let us continue with d * 2 as the BIB design considered in Subsection 6.1.
In our construction (4), take t = 2, with d 1 and d 2 chosen as the dual designs of d * 1 and d * 2 , respectively. Then recalling Definition 2.2, the parameters of d 1 are node. For this KPS, substitution of (34) and (35) in (22) (21) and (23) 
Similarly, substitution of (34) and (35) in (31) and (32) yields
Theorem 5.1 can now be employed to find fail(s). Again, on varying m and g we can get KPSs for a variety of parameter values. Two illustrative examples follow. 
Such a design exists when p(≥ 3) andk(< p + 1) are such thatk − 2 mutually orthogonal Latin squares of order p are available, cf. Definition 2.7. Hence following Definition 2.2, its dual design
We continue with d 2 as in the last two subsections and (34) continues to hold for d 2 . In our construction (4), now take t = 2, with d 1 and d 2 chosen as above.
Clearly, the KPS obtained from d 1 and d 2 via (4) has v =kp + 1 3 (2g + 1)g keys and n = p 2 (2g + 1) nodes, there being k =k + g keys in every node. For this KPS, substitution of (34) and (36) in (22) yields µ 12 = 2 + 2k(p −k) +k(k − 1)(2g + 1) and hence from (21) and (23) we get
Similarly, substitution of (34) and (36) in (31) and (32) yields n 02 = 2g, n 10 = (p − 1)(p + 1 −k), n 20 =k(p − 1), n 22 = 2k(p − 1)g,
Theorem 5.1 can now be easily used to find fail(s). Again, KPSs for a variety of parameter values can be obtained by varying the values of p,k and g. Two illustrative examples follow. This kind of labeling is also possible for the constructions described in Examples 2.6 and 2.7.
Indeed in construction (4), each d * i can potentially be any PBIB design with λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = 1 or any BIB design with λ = 1. Because of such diversity, it is unrealistic in the limited space of this paper to attempt to give an account of the labeling of blocks and symbols, mentioned in (b) above, encompassing all possibilities for d * i , i = 1, . . . , t. For illustration, therefore, we now revisit the setup of Subsection 6.1 in some detail; those of Subsections 6.2 and 6.3 are briefly touched upon later.
Recall that in Subsection 6.1, d * 1 is a group divisible PBIB design constructed as in Example 2.6. Also d * 2 is a BIB design belonging to the Steiner's triple system, and as seen below, it is generated via a cyclic construction. The parameters of these designs are as described in Subsection 6.1. The facts noted below in (A) and (B) for these two designs will be useful.
(A) Labels for symbols and blocks of d * 1 : Denote the af symbols of d * 1 by ordered pairs βγ, where βγ is the γth symbol of the βth group; 1 ≤ β ≤ a and 1 ≤ γ ≤ f . Then as indicated in Example 2.6, its a 2 f 2 blocks are {βγ,βδ}, and let these be labeled as ββγδ, say, where 1 ≤ β <β ≤ a and γ, δ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , f }. Thus, any two distinct symbols βγ andβδ occur together in some block if and only if β =β, and if this happens then the unique block where they occur together has label ββγδ if β <β orββδγ ifβ < β. Let the label for this block be identified as L 1 (βγ,βδ).
Similarly, the (a − 1)f blocks where any symbol βγ occurs have labels (i) ββγδ , where β <β ≤ a and δ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , f }, and (ii)ββδγ where 1 ≤β < β and δ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , f }. Let V 1 (βγ) be the collection of these (a − 1)f block labels. 2 (B) Labels for symbols and blocks of d * 2 : Let g = 1 mod 3 in d * 2 , i.e., g = 3h + 1 for some integer h(≥ 1). So d * 2 involves 6h + 3 symbols and (2h + 1)(3h + 1) blocks. Denote these symbols of d * 2 by ζ u where ζ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2h}, u = 0, 1, 2. Then, the blocks of d * 2 can be represented and labeled as {(y + z) x , (z − y) x , z x+1 } = xyz, say, and {z 0 , z 1 , z 2 } = 0z, say, where x, y and z range over {0, 1, 2}, {1, . . . , h} and {0, 1, . . . , 2h}, respectively, and the subscript x + 1 is reduced modulo 3, while y + z and z − y are reduced modulo 2h + 1. There is a unique block where two distinct symbols ζ u andζ w , (ζ, u) = (ζ, w), occur together and let the label for this block be identified as L 2 (ζ u ,ζ w ).
Since y ranges over {1, . . . , h}, the following are not hard to observe: (a) Let u = w and ζ =ζ. Then L 2 (ζ u ,ζ u ) = uyz, where z = (ζ +ζ)/2 mod 2h + 1 and y = (ζ −ζ)/2 or (ζ − ζ)/2 mod 2h + 1, depending on whether (ζ −ζ)/2 mod 2h + 1 belongs to {1, . . . , h} or {h + 1, . . . , 2h}.
(b) Let u = w and ζ =ζ. Then L 2 (ζ u , ζ w ) = 0ζ.
(c) Let u = w and ζ =ζ. Then L 2 (ζ u ,ζ w ) = xyz, where (x, z) = (u,ζ) or (w, ζ), depending on whether w = u + 1 or u = w + 1 mod 3 and y = ζ −ζ orζ − ζ mod 2h + 1, depending on whether ζ −ζ mod 2h + 1 belongs to {1, . . . , h} or {h + 1, . . . , 2h}.
Similarly, the g(= 3h + 1) blocks where any symbol ζ u occurs are labeled as (i) uyz, where y ∈ {1, . . . , h} and z = ζ ± y mod 2h + 1, (ii) (u − 1)yζ, where y ∈ {1, . . . , h} and u − 1 is reduced mod 3, and (iii) 0ζ. Let V 2 (ζ u ) be the collection of these 3h + 1 block labels.
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Returning to the setup of Subsection 6.1, consider now the KPS constructed as in (4) , respectively, it is clear from (4) that the v keys correspond to the block labels of d * 1 and d * 2 , while the n nodes correspond to ordered pairs whose first member is a symbol of d * 1 and second member is a symbol of d * 2 . Thus, using the facts in (A) and (B), the v keys can be denoted by ββγδ, xyz and 0z, where 1 ≤ β <β ≤ a and γ, δ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , f }, while x, y and z range over {0, 1, 2}, {1, . . . , h} and {0, 1, . . . , 2h}, respectively. Similarly, the n nodes can be labeled as (βγ, ζ u ), where 1 ≤ β ≤ a, 1 ≤ γ ≤ f , and u and ζ range over {0, 1, 2} and {0, 1, . . . , 2h}, respectively. Then clearly, the keys appearing in any node (βγ, ζ u ) are given by the labels of the blocks of d * 1 containing the symbol βγ and the labels of the blocks of d * 2 containing the symbol ζ u . Hence, as discussed in the beginning of this section, the keys shared by two distinct nodes (βγ, ζ u ), and (βδ,ζ w ) are given by the labels of the blocks of d * 1 containing both βγ andβδ and the labels of the blocks of d * 2 containing both ζ u andζ w , i.e., using the facts noted in (A) and (B), these shared keys are as described below:
(i) the keys in V 1 (βγ) and key L 2 (ζ u ,ζ w ), if βγ =βδ and (ζ, u) = (ζ, w);
(ii) the keys in V 2 (ζ u ), if β =β, γ = δ and (ζ, u) = (ζ, w);
(iii) the key L 1 (βγ,βδ) and the keys in V 2 (ζ u ), if β =β and (ζ, u) = (ζ, w);
(iv) the key L 2 (ζ u , ζ w ) if β =β, γ = δ, and (ζ, u) = (ζ, w);
(v) the keys L 1 (βγ,βδ) and L 2 (ζ u ,ζ w ) if β =β and (ζ, u) = (ζ, w) Thus the keys shared by any two distinct nodes can be found readily from the node labels.
Consider any two nodes A and A ′ in each other's neighborhood and by our construction as described above, suppose they are assigned labels (βγ, ζ u ) and (βδ,ζ w ), respectively. In the shared-key discovery phase, node A only broadcasts the four values β, γ, ζ and u. Once node A ′ receives these four values, it simply checks them against the corresponding four values in its own label, decides on one of the five cases in (i)-(v) above and accordingly, it immediately identifies its common keys with A. Thus there is no need to solve any equations nor any complicated computations are involved. Path-key establishment is also similarly straightforward.
For further illustration, we revisit the second example of Subsection 6.1, where a = 2, f = 23 and g = 22. Then, as discussed above, the keys of the resulting KPS can be denoted by 12γδ, xyz and 0z, where γ, δ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 23}, while x, y and z range over {0, 1, 2}, {1, . . . , 7} and {0, 1, . . . , 14}, respectively. Similarly, the nodes of this KPS can be labeled as (βγ, ζ u ) where β = 1 or 2, 1 ≤ γ ≤ 23, and u and ζ range over {0, 1, 2} and {0, 1,. . . , 14}, respectively. From (i) above, the keys shared, for example, by the nodes (16, 4 0 ) and (16, 6 0 ) are 126δ, 1 ≤ δ ≤ 23, which constitute V 1 (16), and L 2 (4 0 , 6 0 ) = 015. Similarly, from (v) above, the nodes (22, 5 1 ) and (13, 6 2 ) share the keys L 1 (22, 13) = 1232 and L 2 (5 1 , 6 2 ) = 116.
The other applications considered in Section 6 allow equally simple discovery of shared keys.
The symbols and blocks of the triangular PBIB design in Subsection 6.2 can be represented along the lines of (A) above. Also, following Lee and Stinson (2008) , the blocks of d 1 in Subsection 6.3 can be so labeled that one can readily identify the common symbol, if any, between two given blocks. Furthermore, if g = 0 mod 3 for the BIB design d * 2 , then one can represent its symbols and blocks in a manner similar to (B) above. These representations readily yield the counterparts of V 1 , V 2 , L 1 and L 2 for these designs. As a result, for constructions involving these designs, keys shared by any two distinct nodes can again be found easily from the node labels.
Comparison of our method with some existing ones
In this paper, we have given a general method for construction of KPSs using duals d 1 , . . . , d t of PBIB or BIB designs. The most important features of our method can be summarized as follows:
(i) It is applicable to any prespecified intersection threshold q ≥ 1.
(ii) It allows the construction of KPSs for a wide spectrum of parameter values, namely, the number of nodes n, the number of keys per node k and the key pool size v, thus enabling the user to find a suitable KPS in a given context.
(iii) It ensures that n is multiplicative in the numbers of blocks of d 1 , . . . , d t while k is additive in the block sizes of these designs. This allows a large n and, at the same time, keeps k in check.
(iv) It comes along with explicit formulae for the local connectivity and resiliency metrics as given by Pr and fail(s). It also keeps the tasks of shared key discovery and path key establishment simple.
As seen earlier, for instance, in the beginning of Section 6 and in Remarks 4.1, 4.2, because of (i)-(iv) above, our method has several advantages compared to the existing ones. We now indicate these advantages in some more detail.
First note that in contrast to (i), the existing methods based on combinatorial designs are typically meant for specific values of q, such as q = 1 in Yener (2004, 2007) , Lee and Stinson (2005a) , Chakrabarty et al. (2006) , Dong et al. (2008) , Ruj and Roy (2007) and Ruj et al. (2009) , or separately for q = 1 and q = 2 in Lee and Stinson (2008) .
Next, as a consequence of (ii), our method allows us to obtain KPSs for networks where the number of nodes n need not be of any specialized form, such as the forms p(p − 1)/2 or p(p − 1) as in Ruj and Roy (2007) , or the forms p 2 (for q = 1) or p 3 (for q = 2), p a prime/prime power, as in Lee and Stinson (2008) . Furthermore, because of (iii) and (iv), this can be achieved with a control on the number of keys k per node, while assuring good values of the performance metrics. To understand why this is important, let q = 2 and suppose we start with a scheme of Lee and Stinson (2008) with n equal to the lowest prime power of the form p 3 that exceeds the target number of nodes. If we then discard the unnecessary node allocations to get the final scheme for use, this final scheme will not preserve the Pr and fail(s) values of the original scheme and hence the properties of the final scheme in this regard can become quite erratic. This is because, these performance metrics of the original scheme depend on the pattern of the keys allocated to the different nodes, this allocation having been done by exploiting the structure of some combinatorial design, and once a large number of the allocated nodes are discarded, the underlying combinatorial structure is disrupted, leading to a scheme with uncertain local connectivity and resiliency properties.
For illustration, suppose it is desired to obtain a KPS with about 16500 nodes. Then our After such large scale deletion, the Pr and fail(s) values of the final scheme very much depend on the particular nodes deleted and hence become quite arbitrary. Similarly, if about 20500 nodes are needed, then our Example 6.6 gives a scheme with 20577 nodes and assured properties while the nearest scheme of Lee and Stinson (2008) with 29 3 = 24389 nodes entails a deletion of about 3889, i.e., 15.95%, of the nodes, leading to unpredictable performance. In either of these situations, the constructions in Ruj and Roy (2007) , with n = p(p − 1)/2 or p(p − 1) and k = 2(p − 2), can bring n close to the target but at the cost of prohibitively large (i.e., 250 or even larger) values of k. In contrast, the schemes in our Examples 6.5 and 6.6 involve only 40 and 41 keys per node. The additive nature of k in our construction, as mentioned in (iii) above, helps in achieving this.
Finally, as noted in (iv), our method comes along with explicit and readily applicable formulae for Pr = Pr 1 + Pr 2 and fail(s), and also keeps the tasks of shared key discovery and path key establishment simple. Not all of these aspects have been explored in many of the existing constructions of KPSs via combinatorial designs, and even when this is done, analytical results on Pr and fail(s) are not always available. For example, Dong et al. (2008) studied only Pr 1 and fail(1) for their scheme. Again, as seen in Remark 4.2, the quantity Pr 2 in the Lee and Stinson (2008) scheme for q = 2 does not admit an explicit expression and its calculation calls for design specific numerical enumeration which can be difficult when the number of nodes is large.
Similarly, Ruj and Roy (2007) and Ruj et al. (2009) gave some bounds on the expected number of links that will be broken if a specified number of nodes are compromised in their schemes and reported associated simulation results, but did not study fail(s). Incidentally, their schemes have Pr 1 = 1, a feature shared also by our construction when the initial designs d * 1 , . . . , d * t are all taken as BIB designs with λ = 1; cf. Example 4.1. However, as argued in Lee and Stinson (2008) , a scheme with Pr 1 = 1 will have poor connectivity in the event of node compromise as reflected in large fails(s) values. This is why we have focused on schemes with good values of Pr rather than attempting to have Pr 1 = 1.
To sum up, our method of construction is a broad spectrum one which supplements and improves upon the existing methods from various considerations. It is applicable to any intersection threshold q ≥ 1 and allows the construction of KPSs for widely diverse parameter values.
The fact that it is supported by a detailed study of the performance metrics, including explicit formulae for Pr and fail(s), further enhances the scope of its application.
